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POLICE POWER AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: 
PRESCRIPTIVE ZONING THROUGH THE 
CONFLATION OF lWO ANCIENT 
DOCTRINES 
DONNAJALBERT PATALANO* 
Abstract: The close historical affinity between the Public Trust doctrine 
and police power supports a more expansive view of zoning. The 
doctrines' kindred public interest spirit can empower localities to adopt 
dynamic, proactive, prescriptive zoning ordinances that promote 
community character. To do so, municipalities must self-define their 
unique community assets and ambiance through an openly developed 
comprehensive plan that honestly memorializes development patterns 
and sets forth community goals. If public interest is at the heart of the 
comprehensive plan, localities may consider an expansion of the police 
power as justified in order to zone and nurture communtiy character 
more justified than zoning which relies on the classic Euclidean general 
welfare criteria. A combination of the police power, infused with the 
Public Trust, and a candid comprehensive plan, could allow localities to 
adopt zoning ordinances that preserve and promote the unique set of 
intangibles that attract people to a community in the first place. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the nearly eighty years since Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co.,l zoning's police power has hidden behind the four criteria that 
the United States Supreme Court crafted in this landmark case: public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.2 While the relationship 
between a zoning ordinance and these four criteria is often appropri-
ate, at times judicial interpretations of these standards promote a le-
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW 2000-Ol. 
Symposium Coordinator, Jane Jacobs & The New Urban Ecology, Boston College Law School 
(Nov. 18,2000). I would like to thank all of my family for their love and support, and espe-
cially my husband, Jim, and children, Jimmy and Matthew, for their patience and encour-
agement. 
) 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
2 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under 
the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 697, 706-07 (1995). The term "police powers" 
first appeared in the landmark Supreme Court decision Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
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gal fiction.3 Indeed, tenuous relations between the recognized criteria 
and the zoning ordinances stretch proffered reasons to the point of 
snapping.4 
This Comment assesses the use of zoning to protect community 
and neighborhood character and to nurture the human ecosystem of 
the city,5 but not under the traditional standards of Village of Euclid. 
Municipalities should instead adopt an expansive view of zoning,6 
justified by the seldom-acknowledged historical roots of the police 
power.7 In recognition of the kindred spirit of the police power and 
the Public Trust doctrine,8 communities should go a step further and 
3 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 728 (quoting John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor 
Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 716-17 (Mass. 1975». 
4 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (declaring zoning power 
could be used to create a "quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi-
cles restricted ... to layout zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people"); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. 
v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding municipalities can use 
general welfare and other acceptable criteria to "preserv[e] the charm of a New England 
small town"); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 228 A.2d 450, 459 (Md. 1967) (finding "preserva-
tion, in some measure, of existing conditions" is an appropriate ends for zoning); Bellaire 
v. Lamkin, 317 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex. App. 1959) (ruling a thirty-inch fence violated an ordi-
nance limiting fence height to twenty-four inches because the higher fence could serve as 
a hiding place for criminals); Gunning Adver. Co. v. St. Louis, 137 S.W. 929, 942 (Mo. 
1911) (finding billboards "endanger the public health, constitute hiding places and re-
treats for criminals and all classes of miscreants"); see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 
(1954) (holding values that represent public welfare include the "spiritual as well as [the] 
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary"); Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 706 n.56 (citing 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528 n.7 (1981)(Brennan,j., concur-
ring) (holding that an ordinance banning billboards was valid, even though Justice Bren-
nan was not satisfied with the sufficiency of the evidence connecting billboards with traffic 
safety). 
5 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES, at xvii (Modern Li-
brary Edition 1993). 
6 See M. Hale, A Narrative LegaU and HistaricaU Touchinge the Customes, reprinted in S. 
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 319, 327 (3d ed. 
1888) ,[hereinafter S. MOORE]; Richardj. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sov-
ereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 636 
(1986); Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Histarical Concept with Modern Re/nJance, 
23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 835, 861 (1982). "Municipality" is used interchangeably with "lo-
cality" and "local government" to refer to counties, cities, towns, and villages. See Michael 
T. Kersten, Exactions, Severability and Takings: H1ien Courts Should Sever Unconstitutional Condi-
tions from Development Permits, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 279, 280 n.2 (2000). 
7 Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Histaric Property 
Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 761, 821 (1979). 
8 See id. A historical view affords one "a more significant perspective on legal reality 
than the logician's analytic intelligence." Id. (quoting M. Howe, Introduction to OLIVER W. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw xix (M. Howe ed., 1968»; see also William Drayton, Jr., The 
Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Dochine, 79 YALE LJ. 762, 764 
(1970). 
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use zoning delegation not just to protect community character, but to 
actually foster and nurture its presence. 
The police power bears a close relation to the Public Trust doc-
trine.9 Both legal doctrines include similar origins in Roman law and 
offer protections in the public interest,10 with the sovereign in control 
of each doctrine's power.ll By acknowledging the similarities of these 
ancient doctrines, localities may confidently adopt dynamic, proac-
tive, prescriptive zoning ordinances12 to promote their community 
character. Just as Professor Joseph Sax urged the judiciary to reach 
back to Roman law in supporting the Public Trust in his seminal 
work, The Public Trust in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion,13 the judiciary should now reach back to the kindred public in-
terest roots of the police power in order to expand its scope. 
Currently, permissible zoning objectives with traits similar to 
character zoning survive judicial scrutiny, despite tenuous relations to 
accepted Euclid-based criteria.14 In part, this expansion of Euclid crite-
ria survives despite the attenuated reasoning because courts grant a 
presumption of validity to zoning ordinances and only find an ordi-
nance invalid if challengers overcome that presumption.15 The cur-
rent expansion of general welfare stretches the zoning fabric, leaving 
slender threads of reasoning to support the presumption that zoning 
ordinances meet judicially acceptable goals. 16 A more reasonable ap-
proach is available, one that does not involve continuing this premise. 
Instead, localities can define community character through theo-
ries of communitarianism and consumer surplus17 in suburban loca-
9 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Butier, supra note 6, at 861 ;Joseph L. Sax, The Public 
Trust in Natural Resource Law: Effective judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 485 (1970) 
[hereinafter Sax, judicial Intervention). 
10 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; and Butler, supra note 6, at 861; Patrick Devaney, 
Title, jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, I SEA GRANT LJ. 13, 43 
(1976). 
11 See Drayton, supra note 8, at 764. 
12 See JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE 259 (1993) (quoting 
Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Professor, University of Miami, interview by author on May 12, 
1990). 
13 SeeSax,JudicialIntervention, supra note 9, at 475. 
14 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 707-08. 
15 See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); see also Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in 
American Land-Use Law: A Substitute for Analysis, A Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.c. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 301, 323 (1996). 
16 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 706. 
17 In this discussion, consumer surplus is, in part, the intangible pride owners have in 
their home and neighborhood. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. 
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tions18 and then memorialize those definitions in a comprehensive 
plan.19 Municipalities can design comprehensive plans to define their 
unique standards.20 Communities, faced with growing sprawl and a 
desire for open spaces, will especially benefit from comprehensive 
plans and prescriptive zoning.21 Furthermore, comprehensive plans 
also serve to put property owners on notice of community characteris-
tics, the very same intangibles that prompted the buyer to choose a 
specific neighborhood in the first instance.22 
Character zoning offers a societal control in the public interest. 
The rights of a community interested in protecting or fostering its 
character may trump the rights of an individual property owner.23 
Given the close affinity between the Public Trust and the police 
power, municipalities may support a more expansive view of the po-
lice power, one that does not erode private property rights but re-
stores the original balance between private property rights and the 
public interest.24 
In this Comment, Part I introduces the historical perspective of 
zoning, from the roots of zoning to the delegation of the zoning 
power in the United States. Part II reviews how municipalities define 
their own character and set standards to zone with respect to com-
munity character. Part III explores the common bonds of the police 
power and the Public Trust, including an examination of the police 
power's Roman law roots. The final section then questions whether, 
by recognizing the police power's historical relation to the Public 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45, 79 (1994) (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 
97-100,203-05,221 (1970); see also infra note 18. 
18 Mary Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350, 362 (1986) 
[hereinafter Radin, Rent Control]. Professor Radin contends homeowners value continuity 
of neighborhoods and personal interests developed by home ownership. In turn, these 
liberty interests further add to a home's consumer surplus. See id. 
19 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745 (quoting MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE 
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1992)). 
20 See Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1154, 
1155 (1955) (finding zoning scheme without a comprehensive plan operates without "co-
herence and discipline in the pursuit of goals of public welfare which the whole municipal 
regulatory process is supposed to serve"); see also Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 79. 
21 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 54 n.36. The largest number of zoning ordinances 
are directed at suburban communities, and the suburbs attract a great deal of money for 
development. See id. 
22 See id. at 65, 70. 
23 See Butler, supra note 6, at 891; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303; see also Joseph L. 
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 36, 40 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Takings]. 
24 See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 16, at 12 (1904); Charles F. Wilkinson, The 
Public T1'1lst Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 269, 313 (1980). 
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Trust, zoning to protect character is more legitimate than it would be 
if crafted under the Euclid standards. 
Localities need to rethink private property rights and what they 
represent given today's growing, demanding, and sprawling society.25 
In view of the potential benefits of character zoning, states should in-
fuse the police power delegation explicitly with the spirit of its related 
doctrine, the Public Trust. This combination can appropriately bol-
ster attempts to preserve and promote that set of intangibles that at-
tracts private property owners to a particular community, allowing 
courts to recognize that the police power is infused with the Public 
Trust. 
I. Zoning 101 
Zoning's historical development is instructive in interpreting the 
current state of zoning regulation. 
A. Brief History of Zoning in the United States 
Historically, zoning has been connected to the common laws of 
nuisance and trespass so that one property owner did not use his land 
to harm others.26 The most fundamental right of property ownership 
today is the right to exclude.27 Zoning better identifies a private prop-
erty owner's right to defend against nuisance, and thereby promotes 
the general health, safety and welfare of the public.28 
States delegate authority for land use planning and regulation.29 
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reserves 
this regulatory power strictly for the states.30 These powers are the 
25 See Coquillette, supra note 7, at 764. 
26 This follows the classic property maxim sic utere tuo ut non alienum non laedas ("so use 
your own property as not to injure your neighbors"). See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926); Symposium, Developments in the Law-Zoning: The Legitimate 
Objectives of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1443, 1449 (1978). Zoning was originally seen as a way 
to resolve nuisances, and courts have sometimes relied on the analogy to nuisance in 
defining the legitimate ends of zoning. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88. 
27 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating right to exclude 
others is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly char-
acterized as property"); see also JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW RULES, POLICIES, AND 
PRACTICES 4 (2d. ed. 1997). Conservative theorists believe that "an absolute conception of 
property ... [is] sacred to personal autonomy." MargaretJane Radin, Property and Person-
hood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 957-58 (1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]. 
28 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1449. 
29 See William D. McElyea, Playing the Numbers: Local Government Authority to Apply Use 
Quotas in Neighborhood CommercialDistlicts, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 335 (1987). 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. X.; see McElyea, supm note 29, at 335. 
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broadest and least limitable source of authority that states grant to 
municipal governments.31 Moreover, since the delegation is granted 
with very little specific guidance, American municipalities arguably 
enjoy "the most liberal property laws on earth. "32 
Local governments derive their authority to zone from state legis-
latures, either from state constitutional home rule or enabling legisla-
tion.33 This delegated authority usually contains broad parameters 
allowing localities to zone principally to protect property owners from 
"negative externalities. "34 Municipalities then use this police power 
for the public good to classifY, specifY and identifY land uses. 35 Usually, 
the enabling statute or home rule legislation grants localities the ap-
propriate means or tools to achieve zoning goals.36 Generally, the 
terms and conditions are broad, offering the municipality flexibility 
in exercising the delegated power because each situation involves 
unique variables that a state legislature is unable to predictY For ex-
ample, zoning ordinances that control housing density and land uses 
help limit change, particularly if any change is inconsistent with, and 
therefore disruptive of, a neighborhood's character.38 
Most states model their zoning enabling statutes on the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act,39 a model act that the U.S. Department of 
Commerce drafted in 1926.40 The Standard Zoning Enabling Act ex-
pressly prescribes uniformity as an underlying goal, and most states 
have adopted the uniformity element.41 However, municipalities may 
change zoning boundaries, particularly when the locus or an adjacent 
31 See James G. Hodge,Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: 
An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 
93, 101 (1997). Without this delegation from the state, a local government has no inherent 
police power. See McElyea, supra note 29, at 335. 
32 KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 26. 
33 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 326. 
34 Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 47. Brought about by new construction and develop-
ments, negative externalities, like a junkyard, are seen as inappropriate to a community. See 
id.; see also McElyea, supra note 29, at 346. 
35 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 345. 
36 See id. at 346. The judiciary must interpret challenged zoning measures and has tra-
ditionally interpreted enabling legislation broadly. See id. 
37 See Symposium, sllpm note 26, at 1455. 
38 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 73. 
39 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (1926). 
40 See McElyea, supm note 29, at 345; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1444; Theordore C. 
Taub & Katherine Castor, Legal Effects of the Cornprehensive Plan: Case Law Update, CA34 ALI-
ABA 113, 115 (1995). 
41 See McHugh v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Boston, 147 N.E.2d 761, 765 n.l (Mass. 
1958) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 2 (1924)). 
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area gradually changes from residential to commercial use (perhaps 
because of traffic patterns or because the locus abuts a commercial 
district).42 If character and use of the locus change after the original 
zoning ordinance, a change in boundary may promote public health, 
morals, safety or welfare.43 Under the generally-adopted Zoning Ena-
bling Act, municipalities can zone "with reasonable consideration ... 
to the character of the district."44 Such consideration would not be 
determinative of a regulation's validity, but could "constitute the 'at-
mosphere' under which the zoning is to be done. "45 
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court first 
outlined standards for a state's police power in municipal land-use 
regulation.46 There, Justice Sutherland specified that zoning regula-
tions cannot be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and must have a 
substantial relationship to "the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare. "47 In part because this zoning could easily subsume neigh-
borhood or community character, the Court recommended munici-
palities zone in conjunction with a carefully drafted comprehensive 
plan.48 
When municipalities wish to zone with broad authority, the gen-
eral welfare ambit is the most conducive criterion available to justify 
this exercise of power.49 Yet, in the early twentieth century, the gen-
eral welfare criterion was considered narrowly in terms simply of 
health and safety.50 Moreover, municipalities originally adopted zon-
ing ordinances with more limited purposes in mind, such as height, 
setback, and lot size requirements, and reduction of traffic conges-
tion.51 Now however, zoning measures backed with general welfare 
reasoning "cannot be even colorably linked to health and safety. "52 
Yet, such reasoning has passed judicial review. 53 
42 SeeLeahyv. Inspector of Bldgs. of New Bedford, 31 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1941); 
Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308. 
43 See id.; Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308. 
44 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (1926). 
45 See id. § 3 n.4. 
46 See 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
47 See id. 
48 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1444. 
49 See id. at 1451, 1452. 
50 See id. at 1445. 
51 See id. 
52 [d. at 1446. 
53 See id. 
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Courts determine which zoning ordinances go beyond the con-
ferred authority; those that fail this test are invalid. 54 As long as courts 
see a real or substantial relation between the ordinance and the pub-
lic health, safety, morals or general welfare, a municipality'S legislative 
enactment enjoys a presumption of validity under the delegated 
authority.55 Courts place the burden of proof on the party challenging 
the regulations, in effect to disprove the stated connection to health, 
safety, and welfare.56 
Still, a locality cannot enact regulations based on post-hoc 
justifications that function like "a few fig leaves of rationalization ... 
decorously draped" on a zoning ordinance.57 To further demonstrate 
the connection between an ordinance and the Euclid criteria, a mu-
nicipality can benefit by having a carefully formulated comprehensive 
plan that sets forth clear, well-defined standards for a reviewing court 
to consider.58 Even without a comprehensive plan, courts have ruled 
that there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of an 
amendment, and if its reasonableness is debatable, the judgment of 
the local authorities will prevail. 59 Critics argue that the presumption 
in favor of validity, along with the expansion of delegated authority, 
place the judiciary in a powerful position to validate current zoning 
schemes.6o 
B. The Current Status of Zoning 
The sticks in the bundle of property rights have changed over 
time.61 As early as 1851, courts recognized the limited nature of prop-
erty rights.62 Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court Lemuel Shaw asserted that implied restrictions are inherent in 
private property: 
54 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954); Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901 
(N.¥. 1968); McElyea, supra note 29, at 346. 
55 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 308. 
56 See Johnson v. Town of Edgartown, 680 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 1997); Hopperton, su-
pra note 15, at 301-02. 
57 See Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1990). 
58 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 307. 
59 SeeCairesv. Bldg. Comm'r of Hingham, 83 N.E.2d 550, 554 (Mass. 1949). 
60 See Hopperton, supra note 15, at 319. 
61 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926); Lazarus, supra 
note 6, at 633; Deveney, supra note 10, at 34. 
62 SeeWILLIAMJ. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE 20 (1996). 
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We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature 
of well ordered civil society, that every holder of property, 
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it 
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regu-
lated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of 
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the commu-
nity.63 
691 
Still, municipalities must provide substantive due process for private 
property owners subject to zoning ordinances.64 The Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments limit the municipality's power to regulate land 
use.65 Under the Fifth Amendment, the federal government cannot 
take private property for public use without due process of the law 
and just compensation.66 State and local governments face the same 
due process restriction.67 When property is taken for public use, mu-
nicipalities compensate the property owner at market value rates.68 
However, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes rec-
ognized the need for government's power to periodically redefine the 
range of interests included in property ownership as necessarily con-
strained by constitutionallimits.69 Police power must be restrained, he 
wrote, otherwise, without a restrained police power, "the natural ten-
dency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more 
until at last private property disappears. "70 State laws accord legal rec-
ognition and protection to the particular interest in land, usually in 
part a reflection of a private property owners' reasonable expecta-
tions. 71 Still, a property owner ordinarily expects property restrictions, 
when a locality regulates land use through the legitimate exercise of 
its police powers.72 Justice Rehnquist stated "[a]s long recognized, 
63 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,85 (1851). 
64 See U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of the law"). Without substantive due process, schol-
ars are concerned that the preferences of an elite few conlc\ be imposed on all members of 
the community. See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 703. 
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 26. 
66 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion"). 
67 See U.S. CONST. amend. XlV. 
68 See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 26. 
69 See 260 U.S. at 413. 
70 See id. at 415. 
71 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1986). 
72 See Pa. Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 483 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978) (Rehnquist,J. 
dissen ting) . 
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some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield 
to the police power. "73 
Today, zoning ordinances often mark the starting point, or "base-
line rules," for development negotiations between localities, neigh-
borhood groups, and developers.74 The municipality serves as arbiter, 
and also defines the standards that are used in reconciling the com-
peting private and public interests.75 Increasingly, however, munici-
palities employ traditional zoning power to protect non-traditional 
goals in addition to the health, safety, and general welfare criteria 
defined in Village of Euclid.76 Proponents believe an extension of the 
municipal power beyond the general welfare purpose reflects com-
mon sense and practicality.77 
For example, courts have difficulty at times justifying aesthetic 
considerations as a valid exercise of the police power, particularly un-
der the general welfare purpose.78 When courts rule that aesthetic 
resources are protected, the judiciary interprets the general welfare 
prong broadly.79 In order to convince a court to employ broad general 
welfare reasoning, a municipality has needed to link the protection of 
a visual resource to a traditional zoning goa1.80 For example, localities 
identified tenuous relationships between perceived eyesores such as 
billboards and traffic safety, a traditional Euclid criteria. 81 
73 See id. at 140 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting). 
74 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 81 n.134 (citing Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: 
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REv. 837, 860 (1983». 
75 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 63. 
76 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 702. 
77 See David S. Winakor, Not in My Front Yard? Smith v. Greenwich Zoning Board of Ap-
peals: The Pitfalls of Local Zoning Decisions and the Power to Consider Historic Factors in Connecti-
cut, 28 CONN. L. REv. 201,217 (1995). 
78 See Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 148 N.E. 842, 844 (Ohio 1925); Louis H. 
Masotti & Bruce I. Selfon, Aesthetic Zoning and the Police Power, 46 J. URB. LAw. 773, 775 
(1969). 
79 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 701; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451; Masotti & 
Selfon, supra note 78, at 775. 
80 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 702. In the beginning stages of delegated zoning 
power in the early 20th century, aesthetics were considered a luxury. See Masotti & Selfon, 
supra note 78, at 777. In Western thought, however, there is a long pedigree of belief that 
recreation and contemplation of nature creates more civilized and sociable people. See 
Carol Rose, The Comedy ofthl! Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 711,781 (1986). Still, the resources and land used for this contemplation are 
not generally protected. See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 703; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 
78, at 777. 
81 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 711. 
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Some jurisdictions concede that this reasoning used to zone for 
aesthetics amounts to a legal fiction, but still approve of the contested 
zoning ordinance.82 The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, stated: 
Mere aesthetic considerations cannot justify the use of 
the police power. It is commendable and desirable, but 
not essential to the public need, that our aesthetic de-
sires be gratified. Moreover . . . the public view as to 
what is necessary for aesthetic progress greatly varies. 
Certain Legislatures might consider that it was more 
important to cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beetho-
ven, for posters than for Rembrandt, and for limericks 
than for Keats.83 
The legal fiction also touches upon the metaphysical,84 In Berman v. 
Parker, the Supreme Court acknowledged that public welfare values 
"are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. "85 
Municipalities are increasingly employing the power to zone in 
order to preserve character.86 Yet, case-by-case extensions by the judi-
ciary fail to provide the citizenry with adequate notice of what is re-
quired under enabling legislation.87 Courts can use general welfare, 
therefore, as a "catchall to constitutionalize otherwise invalid pur-
poses."88 Therefore, critics argue that under the general welfare ex-
pansion, municipalities may exercise the police power with very little 
accountability to the people.89 
II. STANDARDS OF COMMUNITY CHARACTER 
In an effort to avoid claims of lack of accountability, municipali-
ties may adopt comprehensive plans in an effort to identify both its 
community character and land-use objectives.9o 
82 See John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Mass. 
1975) (recognizing "courts have engaged in a reasoning process, often amounting to noth-
ing more than legal fiction, in order to avoid recognizing aesthetics as an appropriate basis 
for the exercise of the police power"); Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 728 n.183. 
83 Youngstown, 148 N.E. at 844. 
84 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
I' 85 Id. 
86 See also Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451. 
87 See Winakor, supra note 77, at 219-20. 
88 Kenneth Regan, You Can't Build that Here: The Constitutionality of Aesthetic Zoning and 
Architectural Review, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1013, 1020 (1990). 
89 See Joel Kosman, Toward An Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 
43 CATH. U. L. REv. 59, 100, 108 (1993). 
90 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1155. 
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A. What is a Community? 
The first critical step in zoning to protect and foster community 
character is to define the standards of a community.91 Communitari-
anism is one approach.92 In this ideology, individuals draw their iden-
tities from the community to which they belong.93 People participate 
in a community by engaging in "one another's nature," and therefore 
"the self is realized in the activities of many selves. ''94 Members of a 
community change through this realization of "many selves,''95 and 
Communitarians believe that conceptions of property changes along 
with them.96 Such a transformation reflects fluid notions about the 
nature of people in the community.97 
A community is a human-built ecosystem98, containing a certain 
"organic wholeness" that is not based on a specific type of building, or 
relation of buildings, but rather on a "whole menu of human val-
ues. ''99 A community can be considered "a living organism" where 
both people and buildings create "a web of interdependencies. "100 
This relationship contributes to the creation of a local economy,IOI 
Typically, homes and neighborhood economies develop into a com-
munity'S two primary, definable elements.102 
The home falls into a special category of property in the com-
munity, property "bound up with one's personhood" and therefore 
tied to "one's sense of continuity and personal identity. "103 The con-
nection between personhood and property creates a community,I04 In 
an effort to better define its community, a municipality must recog-
nize "reverence for the sanctity of the home ... [is] inextricably part 
of the individual, the family, and the fabric of society. "105 
91 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 79. 
92 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745. 
93 See id. (quoting SANDEL, supra note 19, at 150). 
94 SANDEL, supra note 19, at 150-51. 
95 See id. 
96 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 958 
97 See id. 
98 JACOBS, supra note 5, at xvii. Jacobs admonished city planners for failing to deal 
"with a big city as a total organism." Id. at 544. 
99 KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 185. 
100 Id. at 186. 
101 See id. 
102 See id.; see also Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 959,1013. 
103 Radin, Rent Contro~ supra note 18, at 362. 
104 See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 27, at 959,1013. 
105Id. at 1013. 
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Localities could also use "consumer surplus" when defining the 
contours of its community.l06 Consumer surplus reflects the intangible 
pride owners have in their homes. l07 It is, however, mostly overlooked 
because it is difficult to define in quantitative terms. lOB A high level of 
consumer surplus generally attaches to particular features of neigh-
borhood ambiance.109 These "non-fungible" features are "almost 
priceless, especially for long-term neighborhood residents, bound up 
in one's definition of self and sense of his or her place in the 
world. "110 Neighborhoods play a vital role in the development of 
modern urban life, creating an urban fabric to provide a community 
environment for development and maintenance of social relations.lll 
Defining community qualities is essential if a municipality wishes 
to create character-protecting zoning ordinances.ll2 By failing to do 
this, municipalities expose such ordinances to claims of arbitrary and 
capricious action. ll3 Ideals and characteristic traits that reflect a 
community'S character can vary widely among different localities. The 
definition should embody an awareness, consciousness and respect 
for the whole, not viewed as a threat to individual identities, which 
can create a community with "amenity, charm, and beauty" for its citi-
zens.114 Municipalities face the demand, therefore, to develop consis-
tent doctrines that both "satisfY the needs of society and justifY the 
curtailment of property owners' and possessors' rights. "115 
In zoning to protect community character, communitarianism, 
and consumer surplus, municipalities may face charges of crafting 
discriminatory zoning ordinances that simply maintain the status quo 
without letting new members into a community.116 Yet, some courts 
have validated zoning designed to protect a community's overall 
"charm."117 Critics of such findings believe acceptance of such vague 
standards creates limitless power for a municipality to define and 
shape its own character through zoning regulations.l lB Most often, 
106 Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 65. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 65, 70. 
j 110 [d. at 70; see also Symposium, supra note 26, at 1451; Regan, supra note 88, at 1026. 
;Ii 111 See KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 125; McElyea, supra note 29, at 327. 
112 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174-75. 
113 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69-70. 
114 KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 185. 
115 Coquillette, supra note 7, at 764. 
116 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69-70. 
117 Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 959 (lst Cir. 1972). 
118 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1452. 
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however, when a court approves zoning to protect community charac-
ter, it justifies its holding by finding connections to more traditional 
general welfare reasoning.1l9 
In General Outdoor Advertising v. Department of Public Works,120 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found sufficient support for 
ordinances that prohibited billboards.I21 While the court stated that 
"the preservation of scenic beauty and places of historical interest 
would be sufficient support ... considerations of taste and fitness may 
be a proper basis for actions in granting and in denying permits. "122 
Yet, the court premised its reasoning on more than aesthetics.123 The 
court linked aesthetics with travelers' safety, since they might become 
distracted by "the intrusion of unwelcome advertising."124 
Since intangible objectives such as aesthetics and character are so 
amorphous, municipalities have difficulty drawing a clear distinction 
between ideological aims and other permissible objectives.125 Many 
municipalities are exploring ways to preserve neighborhood integrity 
and pride in identifiable, ambient qualities.I26 Public pressure is in-
creasing for this protection.127 Moreover, many landowners perceive 
benefits from these restrictions.I28 The government can limit or sub-
ordinate existing private land use, placing reciprocal duties and de-
mands on all members of the community.129 
Some scholars believe that the police power should offer protec-
tion when private ownership obscures common rights.13o The expand-
ing scope of legitimate police power "exacerbates a growing clash in 
liberal ideology within natural resources law-between the need for 
individual autonomy and security, traditionally tied up in private 
property rights, and the demands of longer-term collectivist goals ex-
pressed in environmental protection and resource conservation 
laws. "131 Yet, a broad communitarian notion of general welfare re-
119 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas. 416 U.S. 1.9 (1974). 
120 193 N.E. 799. 816 (Mass. 1935). 
121 See id. at 816-17. 
1221d. 
123 See id. at 817. 
1241d. at 816. 
125 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1455. 
126 See Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 778-79. 
127 See id. at 786; see also Drayton, supra note 7, at 762. 
128 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303. 
129 See Sax, Takings, supra not.e 23, at 66. 
130 See FREUND, supra note 24, § 16, at 11; Butler, supra note 6, at 890, 891. 
131 Lazarus, supra note 6, at 692; see also Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 70. While these 
are valid charges, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. For more information, see 
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quires some consensus as to what is beautiful, in some locally under-
stood way.132 This notion subsequently helps to define the very core of 
the community and encourages civic pride.I33 A municipality may 
choose a course of action that appears most likely to protect the wel-
fare of a current neighborhood and reinforce its community values, 
resources and institutions. 134 
Comprehensive plans are a necessary step in promoting and pro-
tecting public values inherent in a community.I35 When drafting a 
comprehensive plan, localities can acquire information, through 
questionnaires and interviews to gauge the issues and values that the 
municipality'S residents deem most important in their lives.136 
B. The Comprehensive Plan Component: Defining a Community 
A comprehensive plan can be the essence of zoning.I37 Commu-
nities define their character with comprehensive plans, thereby shap-
ing and protecting their identity through "a certain faculty of 
reflection. "138 Furthermore, communities can maintain their neigh-
borhood character through common, implied and established expec-
tations underlying the current state of the community, while at the 
same time generally recognizing private property rights.I39 
This recognition is the essence of property law.140 The legal sys-
tem recognizes that "the idea of justice at the root of private property 
protection calls for identification of those expectations," such as pri-
vate property owners' reasonable expectations of what they may do 
with their property.141 A comprehensive plan is a long-term general 
generally Yale Rubin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, printed in ZONING 
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar &Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); Kosman, 
supra note 89. 
132 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 70. 
)33 See Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 745-46. 
134 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 77. 
U5 See McElyea, supra note 29, at 364. This is broadly consistent with the precepts of 
"civic republicanism:" some believe our political system is designed to promote and defend 
public values, so that when those public values conflict with private welfare maximization, 
the public values ought to trump. See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 78 n.125. 
1:16 See Jon Witten, Land Use Planning, MCLE MASS. ENVTL. LAw, 1999 SlIpp., 
§19.5.1 (a). 
m SeeVdell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.Y. 1968). 
us SANDEL, supra note 19, at 152; see Haar, supra note 20, at 1174-75. 
U9 See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 
V.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 185, 187 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Public T1'1lstj. 
140 See id. at 186-87. 
HI Id. at 187. 
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outline of projected development, and zoning is one set of tools used 
to implement the long-term plan and to recognize owner expecta-
tions.142 In part, municipalities grant private property owners notice 
of the reasonable expectations implied by the community's current 
state of being. 143 
In an effort to set land-use goals, many state legislatures encour-
age municipalities to draft comprehensive plans. l44 Most municipali-
ties use a comprehensive plan as a "preliminary, sketchy, first-draft" 
version of their zoning ordinance,145 Notably, most localities did not 
have comprehensive plans when they passed their first zoning ordi-
nances under enabling acts,146 Therefore, many municipalities retro-
fit their comprehensive plan around zoning already in effect.147 In the 
best circumstances, a comprehensive plan creates an insurance policy 
for the municipality, in order to avoid challenges of unreasonableness 
when exercising their delegated zoning authority to regulate in the 
name of the public welfare.148 Mter nearly eighty years since Village of 
Euclid, there still is no clear definition of a comprehensive plan. 
To create a comprehensive plan, a municipality typically enlists a 
planning commission to create a first draft.149 In addition, municipali-
ties often also select urban planners to help, because they perceive 
that planners are less likely to let prejudices or short-term political 
considerations effect their work.150 However, many municipalities do 
not enjoy the luxury of a full-time planner and instead depend on 
part-time consultants or a voluntary board.151 
142 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1156. 
143 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 187. 
144 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174-75; see a150 Witten, supra note 136, § 19.5. 
145 Haar, supra note 20, at 1174. 
146 See Taub & Castor, supra note 40, at 115. 
147 The process of planning is greeted by a great deal of skepticism. See generally JACOBS, 
THE DEATH AND LIFE, supra note 5, at 544. 
148 See Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 469 (N.Y. 1968); Haar, supra note 20, at 1174; 
Winakor, supra note 77, at 220-21 (explaining that a broad reading of enabling legislation 
can lead to a lack of notice for citizens, particularly when a local zoning board makes many 
exceptions to zoning ordinances through special exceptions and permits);john R. Nolan, 
Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where to Grow, 13 PACE L. REv. 351, 351 
(1993). 
149 See Sam D. Starritt & john H. Mcclanahan, Land Use Planning and Takings: The Vi-
ability of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West after Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994),30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 415, 422 (1995). 
150 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1453; Nolan, supra note 148, at 360. 
151 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 49 n.15; Thomas Farragher, Land Battle on the Cape, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE,jan. 20, 1998, at Metro AI. 
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Planners divide a comprehensive plan into several principal ele-
ments, including an inventory of built and natural assets, develop-
ment of goals and policies, and a list of tools to use in reaching these 
goals and policies.152 The inventory focuses on assets including: a pat-
tern of land uses, mass transportation design, street systems, park and 
recreational systems, and the location of affordable housing and pub-
lic buildings.153 In their comprehensive plans, municipalities also in-
clude the locations of water supplies and sanitation facilities, boule-
vards and tree planting, transportation of goods, and market 
locations.154 
In addition, comprehensive plans ideally address the division of 
developable lands, regulation of building height, structure area with 
relation to the size of lot, and use of structures on the land. I55 Gener-
ally, professional planners agree that comprehensive plans should 
provide goals and objectives with respect to the communities' desired 
future development. I56 Lack of a comprehensive plan, and local legis-
lative acquiescence to pressure groups or developers, allows tracts of 
land to pass into development with little thought towards long-term 
ecological or social consequences.157 
Most importantly, the community benefits from the opportunity 
to gather and comment during the process, permitting zoning deci-
sions to be based on the needs of the whole community.I5S Moreover, 
by memorializing goals in a comprehensive plan, localities promote 
more honest and predictable dealings between their zoning bodies 
and private property owners.I59 In this process, after drafting is com-
plete, the locality'S legislative body votes to adopt the comprehensive 
plan. I60 
If a town has openly developed a comprehensive plan, the exis-
tence of that plan may sustain even burdensome land regulations dur-
152 See Witten , supra note 136, §§ 19.5.1-19.5.3. 
153 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 363 n.51 (quoting HAROLD M. LEWIS, PLANNING THE 
MODERN CITY 54-55 (1949)); Witten, supra note 136, § 19.5.1. 
154 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 363 n.51. Comprehensive plans can be a combination 
of reports, maps, charts and graphs. See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174. 
155 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174. 
156 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 364; Haar, supra note 20, at 1155; see also Witten, supra 
note 136, § 19.5.2; Starritt & Mcclanahan, supra note 149, at 422. 
157 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 13. 
158 Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900 (N.V. 1968) (finding a civilized form of existence 
requires the input of many); see Nolan, supra note 148, at 364; Regan, supra note 88, at 
1029; see also Devaney, supra note 10, at 35. 
159 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029. 
160 See Starritt & Mcclanahan, supra note 149, at 422. 
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ing judicial review. I61 In the absence of the open communication re-
quired for a comprehensive plan, however, zoning for community 
character potentially endangers the creative freedoms of property 
owners and impinges their reasonable expectations. I62 Ultimately, ju-
dicial review exists as a check on discretionary accountability.I63 A 
court must test the validity of a zoning ordinance or by-law, to ensure 
that it complies with the terms and scope of the enabling statute and 
the comprehensive plan. I64 If some rational relationship exists be-
tween the regulation and the objectives of the comprehensive plan, 
courts take a "fresh look" at a zoning scheme. I65 
Municipalities continually struggle to separate zoning from com-
prehensive planning, and planners always warn of the danger of con-
fusing the twO.I66 Simply put, the locality can give notice of their self-
defined community assets to the general public (and to a reviewing 
court) by authorizing the creation of a comprehensive plan.I67 By fail-
ing to use a comprehensive plan to its full benefit, a locality may lack 
notice and also fail to curtail market forces through a public plan for 
manageable development.I6S Rational development through a com-
prehensive plan can aid in stabilizing and preserving property val-
ues. I69 Yet, while legislatures encourage local governments to develop 
comprehensive plans, many states do not require them by statute. I70 
Comprehensive planning is becoming more critical for cities and 
metropolitan areas due to increased pressure on land resources.17l 
161 See Nolan, supra note 148, at 380, 393. 
162 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029. Especially in the face of "big house syndrome," 
property owners are angered when faced with more restrictive ordinances because they 
believe such restrictions will ultimately decrease their property values. See Lisa Prevost, Big 
House Syndrome Opens Doors to Complaints, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 12,2000, at New Eng-
land DlO. 
163 See Sax,Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 559; Haar, supra note 20, at 1174. 
164 See McElyea, supra note 35, at 346. 
165 See Taub & Castor, supra note 40, at 115. 
166 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1156. 
167 See also Town of E. Greenwich v. Narragansett Elee. Co., 651 A.2d 725, 727 (R.1. 
1994) (finding that a comprehensive plan "is not simply the innocuous general-policy 
statement ... [but is rather] comprised of text, maps, illustrations ... establish [ing] a 
binding framework or blueprint that dictates town or city promulgation of conforming 
zoning and planning ordinances"). 
168 See Nolan, supra note 148, at351, 357. 
169 See id. at 355. 
170 SeeWiuen, supra note 136, §19.5. 
171 See supra notes 165-70; Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 786. 
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For instance, Massachusetts loses forty-four acres a day to "sprawl. "172 
According to the Environmental Protection Agency, although Massa-
chusetts's population growth has been less than five percent during 
the last fifteen years, land use has increased twenty-five percent.I73 
Moreover, eighty percent of construction in America has been built in 
the last fifty years.174 Private property owners are destroying existing, 
humble homes at a record rate in order to construct today's fashion-
able "bigger-is-better" homes.175 
In response, some California towns have ordered temporary halts 
to single-family demolitions, until these municipalities "rethink" their 
regulations.176 The East Coast is experiencing the same phenomenon: 
Greenwich, Connecticut, long a desired location for the wealthy, is-
sued fifty-seven permits in 1999 to demolish existing homes, com-
pared to fifteen in 1994.177 The current sustained economic boom has 
resulted in development pressure, pushing municipalities to consider 
adopting innovative solutions forged in the public interest. 
By creating legislative history, comprehensive plans protect these 
solutions since all considerations identified during drafting become 
part of the record.178 Finally, the community's definition of self helps 
to shape the contours of how that community is willing to act on be-
half of the public interest. If the public interest is at the heart of a 
comprehensive plan, towns may consider an expansion of the police 
power as a justification to zone, rather than having to rely on classic 
Euclidean general welfare criteria,179 Municipalities may look to the 
police power's Roman law origins to better understand the appropri-
ateness of the police power expansion. 
172 See James L. Franklin, Growing Smarter, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1999, at City 
Weekly 1. 
173 See id. 
174 KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 10. 
175 See Prevost, supra note 162, at New England DI0. 
176 See id. at Dl1. 
177 See id. at DIO. 
178 The Massachusetts's Legislature recently considered a bill, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Act (SDA) , which requires localities to adopt comprehensive plans and offers botll 
funding and guidelines to accomplish that end. See H.B. 4S05, ISlst General Court, Reg. 
Sess. (Mass. 1999). The SDA would also fund the training of botll town officials and volun-
tary planning boards, in an effort to encourage "more consistent, more predictable deci-
sion-making." See Franklin, supra note 172, at City Weekly 1. Through the SDA, a clear 
presumption in favor of zoning decisions supported with a comprehensive plan would 
exist, ghing localities the ability to win zoning challenges on all but tile most egregious 
decisions. See McElyea, supra note 29, at 363; Haar, supra note 20, at 1155. 
179 SeeVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Haar, 
supra note 20, at 1168-69. 
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III. ROMAN LAw ROOTS 
Laws crafted to protect the public interest are rooted in Roman 
law. Legislators, jurists, and policymakers have all gained inspiration 
from the teachings of Roman law. I80 Furthermore, Roman law func-
tions as "a useful model of doctrinal purity," that some scholars be-
lieve modern society should follow.181 Both the police power and Pub-
lic Trust doctrine share a common foundation in Roman Law.l82 
Moreover, English law also acknowledged the interrelation between 
these doctrines.183 Finally, in the United States, both doctrines devel-
oped in alliance with the public interest. I84 
A. Common Roman Origins 
An organized legal system developed under Roman law.185 Justin-
ian, the Emperor from the East, commissioned legal works to memo-
rialize the Roman legal system.186 Justinian's relevance continues to-
day because he collected, printed, and preserved Roman law just as 
the ancient world was beginning to crumble, leaving merely remnants 
of the developed society for reference. I87 In 533 A.D., Justinian com-
missioned an elementary textbook for students, The Institutes.188 Al-
though Justinian only hoped to settle outstanding controversies and 
formally abolish obsolete institutions with this text, Justinian's con-
temporaries regarded The Institutes highly.189 The Institutes was not case 
law but a treatise, containing a civil code and a summary of contem-
porary legal scholarship.190 
180 Coquillette, supra note 7, at 821. 
181 Drayton, supra note 7, at 764. "[T] he politician, the economist, the engineer and 
the lawyer can find inspiration in the roots of our legal heritage." Coquillette, supra note 7, 
at 821. 
182 See infra Part lILA. 
183 See infra Part IILB. 
184 See infra Parts IILC-D. 
185 See Butie1', supra note 6, at 846. 
186 See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 39 (1962). Justinian's 
realm centered in Constantinople, but before the end of his reign in 565, his army con-
quered Italy. See id. at 44. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at 41; Butier, supra note 6, at 849. 
189 See NICHOLAS, supra note 186, at 41; Butier, supra note 6, at 850 n.61. 
190 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 19-20. Devaney quotes Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 
Johns. 507, 519-20 (N.V. Sup. Ct. 1812): 'The civil code was, in its origin, merely munici-
pal; but from the extent of country and population for which it was devised, from the great 
antiquity of its sources ... it has been deservedly held in reverence by all of the civilized 
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Of particular note, The Institutes examined the development of 
two branches of public and private law: res publicum and res privatum.191 
Under res privatum, a complex classification system of property rights 
existed, including seisin, the natural rights inherent to property.192 Sei-
sin included protection against interference with a private property 
owner's use or enjoyment of property, a concept still strong today,193 
Roman law also organized additional property classifications under 
separate categories, with two classifications key to the relationship be-
tween the police power and the Public Trust doctrine: jus regium and 
jus publicum. 194 
Like today's police power, jus regium in Roman law was the sover-
eign right to manage resources for public safety and welfare,195 Justin-
ian also defined the royal prerogative, where the sovereign held and 
safeguarded the shores and navigable rivers for the common use and 
benefit of the public as the jus publicum.196 On the other hand, jus pub-
licum allowed the government to hold certain common properties, 
such as rivers, the seashore and the air, for public use. 197 A lesser 
classification also existed, jus privatum, granting private rights of use 
and possession, which was also subject to the jus publicum.198 For in-
world, and in many European countries, is the avowed basis of their municipal laws .... " 
Id. 
191 See ERNEST METZGER, A COMPANION TO JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 44 (1998); Butler, 
supra note 6, at 847. 
192 See Butler, supra note 6, at 847; Coquillette, supra note 7, at 770. These different 
property classifications included res divine (property dedicated to and subject to the gods), 
res omnium communes (things legally not property because they were incapable of domin-
ion), and res nullis (things not possessed by an individual but capable of possession). See 
Coquillette, supra note 7, at 770; see also Sax, Public Trust, sujJTa note 139, at 185. English 
law integrated seisin concepts when, in the 13th century, Bracton wrote that the natural 
rights of seisin were among the earliest legally protected rights. See Coquillette, supra note 
7, at 772. From this concept, English common law delineated the classic property rule sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors). 
See id. at 770-72. 
193 SeeCoquillette, supra note 7, at 770-72. 
194 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Devaney, supra note 10, at 43. 
195 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636. 
196 See Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public TTllst and the Massachusetts 
Cownial Ordinance, 62 ALB. L. REv. 623, 628 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,89-94 (1851) (explaining the rights of the king to govern the sea gave 
way to the colonial government and became vested in the commonwealth). 
197 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 16. 
198 See Fernandez, supra note 196, at 627-28; see alm BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN 
LAW AND COMMON LAW 71 (1936). In addition to the general principle that a person's 
rights over his property were limited by the rights of others, Roman law had a number of 
specific rules, often local, limiting the heights of buildings, and the use of particular sites 
for building. See BUCKLAND & McNAIR, supra note 198, at 71. Buckland and McNaiI' stated 
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stance, the sovereign could grant jus privatum title to a subject, a grant 
conferring privileges and benefits subject to the jus publicum.199 
Another Roman property classification important to the devel-
opment of the Public Trust doctrine, res communes, reinforced jus pub-
licum by declaring some property "common to all. "200 Romans en-
dowed this classification with particular importance since their society 
depended on commerce related to the sea.201 Private interest could 
not monopolize vital resources, like the sea, to the detriment of the 
rights of the general population under res communes.202 
B. English Law Development 
The English incorporated Roman concepts of common property 
and public rights into both the Magna Charta and the English com-
mon law.203 In his 13th century work De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Ang-
liae, the legal scholar Bracton first introduced Roman law by inter-
preting Justinian's Institutes as a declaration that the sea and seashore 
were common to all. 204 Scholars believe that Bracton relied on Roman 
law, but that he also amended the historical precepts to create a rule 
of law he perceived to be more desirable than a strict reading of Ro-
man law.205 Nonetheless, Bracton's contemporaries emulated and re-
lied upon his scholarship.206 
Besides recognizing res communes classifications, English law ac-
knowledged jus regium and jus publicum.207 In his First Treatise, Sir Mat-
thew Hale further refined Bracton's interpretation of Roman law, de-
scribing the jus regium as the "prerogative intereste ... that right which 
peculiarly belonges to the Kinge as the supreme magistrate, and this is 
that "a more peculiar feature of the Roman law is the existence of a large number of spe-
cial provisions regulating the relations between neighbours, a matter which, in our law, 
seems to be left to the ordinary law of trespass and nuisance." Id. 
199 See Butler, supra note 6, at 862. While inland properties were not "trust resources" 
under jus publicum, they were still subject to the right of the Crown to manage them for the 
public good. See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 274. 
200 See]. INsT. 2.1.1; see Richard Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctline, and The 
Protection of In stream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 407, 409 (1986); Coquillette, supra note 7, at 
802 n.195. 
201 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409. 
202 See id. 
203 See Fernandez, supra note 196, at 627. 
204 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 36; Butler, supra note 6, at 858. 
205 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 36. 
206 See Butler, supra note 6, at 858. 
20i See Devaney, supra note 10, at 43; see also infra note 210, 215. 
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uncomunicable to any subject. "208 This right, Lord Hale stated, was 
"lodged" in the Crown in order to attain safety for the kingdom, pro-
tect commerce and trade, and safeguard the revenue of the Crown 
and his subjects.209 In distinguishing jus regium and jus publicum, Lord 
Hale believed the sovereign held a duty to protect and preserve the 
jus publicum because the Crown protected public rights under jus re-
gium (those duties that a sovereign owed to its people) .210 
With a focus on coastal resources and the commerce it created, 
Lord Hale defined the jus regium as encompassing the police powers 
of the sovereign, the ability of the Crown as sovereign to manage the 
kingdom's resources for public safety and welfare.21l Lord Hale intro-
duced the concept of jus publicum, the idea that no one, not even the 
Crown, could destroy or alienate certain public rights in property.212 
The sovereign defends any public rights existing in privately held land 
under his jus regium.213 So, in early English common law, the Crown 
held title to tidal lands and waters for public benefit.214 English law-
yers cited the passage in Justinian's Institutes promoting res communes: 
208 S. MOORE, supra note 6, at 327; see Butler, sujJra note 6, at 861. The American judici-
ary acknowledged Lord Hale's renown and considered him "a most learned judge" who 
carried the "authority of ... great men." Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. I, 52, 53 (NJ. 
1821) (Kirkpatrick, CJ.). 
209 S. MOORE, supra note 6, at 327. 
210 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861, 863. Lord Hale wrote his treatise at the time of 
Charles II. See Devaney, supra note 10, at 41. 
2ll See Butler, supra note 6, at 861. 
212 See id. at 862. Lord Hale's writing has been seen as a set of governing rules "recog-
nized by the courts of justice as controlling doctrines." Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 367,423-24 (1842). 
213 See Butler, supra note 6, at 862. 
214 See id. at 878. Some controversy among legal historians exists as to the strength of 
the original assertion by the Crown that the sovereign held this land in trust. See Devaney, 
supra note 10, at 43. In the sixteenth century, the Crown attempted to regain possession of 
the tidelands through the work of Thomas Digges, a lawyer, surveyor and engineer, who 
published a pamphlet on behalf of Elizabeth I entitled Proofs oj the Queen's Interest in Lands 
Left by the Sea and the Salt Shored Thereof, reprinted in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORE-
SHORE AND THE LAw RELATING THERETO 185-211 (3d ed. 1888). Digges answered possible 
objections by relying on Cicero's stoic rule that "by nature nothing is private" (sunt autem 
privata nulla natura ... ). Devaney, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting CICERO DE OFFICIIS 1, 7). 
This push to regain the shore was prompted in part because the English monarchs allowed 
much of this land to fall into private hands in tile Middle Ages, and now wanted to regain 
possession. See id. Digges controversial "prima facie" theory of tidelands as a distinct cate-
gory of property that private parties could only acquire by an express grant from the sov-
ereign was at first rejected by English courts, until Sir Matthew Hale later adopted it in his 
influential treatise DeJure Maris. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409-10; M. Hale, A Treatise 
Relative to the Maritime Law oj England in Three Parts, reprinted in S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF 
THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370 (reprinted 1993) (3d ed. 1888). 
706 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:683 
"[b]y natural law, these things are the common property of all: air, 
running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the sea" to support 
the Crown's dominance over these properties.215 
The New World colonies succeeded to the Crown's interests after 
the Revolution.216 Like the King, the colonies (and then the states) 
held these lands in trust for the benefit of the public.217 Under Royal 
charters, England granted colonies title to both jus publicum and jus 
privatum lands, as well as the right to regulate such lands under the jus 
regium.218 Mter the American Revolution, these property interests, and 
the related police power and Public Trust doctrine, passed to the 
newly created states and have remained in the purview of state law.219 
In 1842, the Supreme Court resolved the succession of power 
from the Crown to the colonies, and ultimately to the state govern-
ments as representatives of the people.22o The dispute in Martin v. 
Waddell focused on the right to cultivate oyster beds in mudflats.221 
The Court ruled that the "letters patent" handed to the Duke of York 
from his brother Charles II did indeed carry with it all rights of the 
sovereign.222 Moreover, since New Jersey was now sovereign, it held 
the jus regium in the land underlying the waters.223 The jus regium fol-
lowed the public character of the property, as it was held by the whole 
people for purposes in which the whole people were interested.224 
This right was further defined in Commonwealth v. Alger, when the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court established that the jus regium was a 
royal prerogative.225 
215 Coquilette, supra note 7, at 801 (quoting]. INST. 2.1.1 (Professor Coquilette's trans-
lation) ). 
216 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 411; Butler, supra note 6, at 879-80. 
217 See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 78 (NJ. 1821); Ausness, supra note 200, at 411. 
218 See Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 839,845 (1984). 
219 See Arnold, 6 NJ.L. at 78. Here, the court stated the people of each state became 
themselves sovereign. See id. (defining the jus regium as "the right of regulating, improving, 
and securing for the common benefit of every individual citizen"); see also Wilson, supra 
note 218, at 845. 
220 See Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,415 (1842). 
221 See id. at 407. 
222 See id. at 415. 
223 See id. at 416. 
224 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 410-11. 
225 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,92 (1851). A prerogative is primarily 
defined by Webster as "an official and hereditary right (as a royal sovereign) that may be 
asserted without question and for which there is in theory no responsibility or accountabil-
ity as to the fact and manner of its exercise though in practice it is usually limited by the 
power of public opinion or by statute and is generally (as in England) exercised on the 
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C. American Development of the Police Power 
In the United States today, police power centers on the dual goals 
of securing and promoting the public welfare with both regulatory 
restraints and compulsions.226 The Supreme Court affirmed that the 
police power should be exercised on behalf of the public interest. 227 
States secure this role by reserving sovereign power over "all the ob-
jects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber-
ties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the state. "228 States delegate police power to 
municipalities, in place of specific statutory provisions.229 A munici-
pality may only exercise this power in the public interest and in a way 
rationally formulated and impartially administered to attain the de-
sired purpose.230 Even with appropriate means, the state's police 
power encroaches on private property ownership.231 
The police power evolved in response to increased societal con-
cern.232 Even in Village of Euclid, Justice Sutherland understood that 
the scope of the application of the police power "must expand and 
contract to meet the new and different conditions. "233 Courts have 
broadened legitimate police power goals in a more flexible embrace 
of preservation goals, an end result that is in the public interest at 
large.234 Courts find it harder to define the police power given this 
flexibility.235 
Despite Justice Sutherland's view in Village of Euclid, courts gener-
ally construed the police power narrowly in the early 20th century.236 
At that time, scholars suggested natural resource conservation and 
aesthetic protection fell outside the confines of the police power's 
advise of ministers who are responsible to a legislative body.fl WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1791 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. ed., 1986). 
226 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); FREUND, supra 
note 24, §3, at 3. 
227 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; see also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
228 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
The Framers of the Constitution understood sovereign police powers to pre-exist the 
country's formation. See Hodge, supra note 31, at 101. 
229 See Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 774. 
230 See id.; see supra notes 29-44 and accompanying text. 
231 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1031. 
232 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 658. 
233 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
234 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 678. 
235 See Berman v. Pal-ker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
236 See Symposium, supra note 26, at 1443. State courts held the primary responsibility 
for defining the legitimate ends of the police power at this time. See id. at 1444. 
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traditional health and safety concerns.237 However, in time, regulation 
of both land and commerce has increased, and the impact of the po-
lice power on private ownership can, in Professor Sax's words, hardly 
be ignored.238 
Justice Holmes acknowledged the potential "petty larceny of the 
police power. "239 In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, he warned of the po-
lice power's erosive effects on private property: "the natural tendency 
of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and 
more until at last private property disappear[ed]."24o A more expan-
sive view of the police power does result in the further narrowing of 
private property rights and its corresponding scope of private expec-
tations.241 The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in placing real 
limits on the police power in Berman v. Parker.242 Justice Douglas wrote 
that "an attempt to define [the police power's] reach or trace its outer 
limits is fruitless for each case must turn on its own facts .... Yet they 
merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it ... the 
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... "243 
The police power developed into an elastic construct, "neither 
abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition. "244 Police 
power regulations "mirrored" the public property doctrine.245 The 
police power allows allows property regulation, which in turn protects 
the part of the economoy tied to real estate interests (such as real es-
tate development or a business's ability to control rental expenses).246 
The private landowner always held land subject to a common 
right, even if the right was not fully exercised to the broad expansion 
of today's general welfare power.247 Every member of the community 
submits to these regulations, though not all are affected by them.248 
237 See FREUND, supra note 24, § 15, at 11; Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 39. 
238 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 40. 
239Id. at 55 (quoting 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 457 (Howe ed. 1953». 
240 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
241 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 n.303. 
242 See 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
243 Id. at 32. 
244 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see FREUND, supra note 24, § 3, at 3; see Hodge, supra note 31, 
at 100; Regan, supra note 88, at 1017. 
245 Rose, supra note 80, at 773. 
246 See id. at 772. The classic police power case, Munn v. Illinois, illustrates this point. 94 
U.S. 113 (1877). There, Chief Justice Taney defined the police power as the authority of 
"every sovel'eign to the extent of its dominions." Id. at 126-27. 
247 See Butler, supra note 6, at 846. A common right (such as the ability for a commu-
nity to zone particular densities) might not be apparent or exercised. Butler states that 
"inaction usually is not an effective method of extinguishing a property right." See id. 
248 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 66. 
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Nonetheless, a reciprocity exists because all members of the commu-
nity have similar obligations.249 The police power creates protections 
for the public when individual interests need to yield to general social 
interests because of social, economic, and political conditions.25o 
Therefore, when a municipality places restrictions on land, it is acting 
as a sovereign, in the public interest, exercising its jus regium.251 
D. American Development of the Public Trust Doctrine 
Today, scholars and jurists recognize that the Public Trust is a 
common law principle with constitutional dimensions, because it re-
stricts the power of state legislatures.252 In 1821, an American court 
first suggested the concept of the Public Trust in Arnold v. Mundy.253 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "the wisdom of [the com-
mon] law has placed it in the hands of the sovereign power, to be 
held, protected and regulated for the common use and benefit. "254 
But the court also recognized the relation to the jus regium of the po-
lice power in setting the lands aside. 255 
In this case, which focused on the ownership of oyster beds, Chief 
Justice Kirkpatrick stated that legal title to common property vested at 
the Revolution in "the people."256 The people then passed this power to 
their representatives in the legislature. This power 
that is nothing more than what is called the jus regium, the 
right of regulating, improving, and securing for the common 
benefit of every individual citizen. The sovereign power it-
self, therefore, cannot consistently with the principles of the 
law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, 
make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of the state 
divesting all the citizens of their common right.257 
249 See id. 
250 See FREUND, supra note 24, §§ 3, 16, at 3, 12. 
251 See infra notes 226-31. 
252 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 408 n.8. Some states have now codified the Public 
Trust in their constitutions: Florida, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and 
Virginia. See id. 
253 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1,78 (NJ. 1821). 
254 Bell v. Gough, 1852 WL 3448, at *34 (NJ. Err. & App. 1852) (quoting Arnold, 6 
N J.L. at 71 (Kirkpatrick, CJ.) ) . 
255 Arnold, 6 NJ.L. at 78. 
256 See id. 
257 [d. 
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The Supreme Court crafted the classical concept of the Public 
Trust in American jurisprudence in Illinois Central RR Co. v.Illinois.258 
In this case, the Court voided the Illinois state legislature's grant of 
more than 1,000 acres of lakeshore property in the City of Chicago to 
the Illinois Railroad Company.259 Justice Field wrote that the legisla-
ture failed in its role as trustee for this land because "trusts connected 
with public property, or property of a special character, like lands un-
der navigable waters ... cannot be placed entirely beyond the direction 
and control of the state."260 Such property, Justice Field wrote, is sub-
ject to the "public concern to the whole people of the state ... and 
cannot be alienated ... without detriment to the public inter-
est. ... "261 
In Illinois Central R.R Co., the Supreme Court also associated the 
Public Trust with the jus regium. 262 Justice Field reiterated the words of 
Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Waddell: 263 
the power exercised by the state ... is nothing more than 
what is called the jus regium, the right of regulating, improv-
ing, and securing them for the benefit of every individual 
citizen ... '[t]he sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, 
consistently with the principles of the law of nature and the 
constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct and ab-
solute grant ... divesting all the citizens of their common 
right. It would be a grievance which never could be long 
borne by a free people.'264 
However, Justice Shiras, in the dissent, disagreed with the connection 
of the jus regium with the jus publicum.265 He stated that the extent of a 
grant and its resulting effect on the "public interests" in the property 
are matters of legislative discretion.266 Nonetheless, the Court's major-
ity recognized the symbiotic relationship between the police power 
and the Public Trust doctrine. 267 
258 See generally 146 V.S. 387 (1892). 
259 See id. at 433, 454. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 455. 
262 See id. at 456 (quoting Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 V.S. (16 Pet.) 367,414 (1842). 
263 See Illinois Cent. RR Co., 146 V.S. at 456. 
264 Id. 
265 See id. at 466 (Shiras,J., dissenting). 
266 See id. at 467. 
267 See id. at 456, 466. 
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Thirty years ago, legal scholars revitalized the essentially dormant 
Public Trust doctrine.268 During the reinvigoration of the Public Trust 
doctrine in the early 1970s, scholars pointed to Roman law for histori-
cal support for the theory that certain public interests are "so intrinsi-
cally important to every citizen" that they must continue in today's 
legal system.269 The historical role of the Public Trust was to provide a 
public property basis for resisting the exercise of private property 
rights in natural resources that was deemed contrary to the public 
interest. The historical role came back into vogue. 270 
The Public Trust doctrine relies on judicial review and judge-
made principles.27I Parties allegedly violating the Public Trust face 
three categories of claims: (1) private citizens suing the government; 
(2) private citizens suing other private parties; and (3) the govern-
ment suing private parties.272 However, litigation focusing on the Pub-
lic Trust imposes a "destabilizing disappointment of expectations held 
in common but without formal recognition such as title. "273 Simply 
put, there is a notice problem.274 In his seminal work on the Public 
Trust, Professor Joseph Sax argues that at some point courts should 
hold private property owners responsible for knowing that "historical 
protection and open-space preservation [are] important public values 
and that they [are] increasingly being protected to the detriment of 
landowners. "275 Therefore, Professor Sax concludes, courts should not 
be sympathetic to property owners' claims of reasonable expectations 
being usurped by the Public Trust doctrille.276 
Flexibility is an essential characteristic of the Public Trust doc-
trine.277 The Public Trust, however, is less flexible than the police 
power, perhaps because of the substantive mandate of the police 
power.278 In the last fifteen years, municipalities have invoked the Pub-
lic Trust doctrine in the majority of cases brought to resolve dis-
putes.279 In contemporary cases, the Public Trust represents an op-
268 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 646. 
269 Sax,judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 484 (quoting Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 
U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,414 (1842»; Drayton, supra note 8, at 787. 
270 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 633. 
271 Seev\'ilkinson, supra note 24, at 315. 
272 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 645-46. 
273 Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188. 
274 See id. at 188 n.13. 
275Id. 
276 See id. 
277 See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 304-05. 
278 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 274 n.269. 
279 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188. 
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portunity for after-the-fact democratization of the process of zoning 
and development.28o 
IV. POLICE POWER: PRESERVATION, PROMOTION & ENHANCEMENT OF 
COMMUNITY CHARACTER 
A. Similarities in Scope and Perspective 
The conflation of the Public Trust doctrine and the police power 
started with The Institutes.281 When classifying property into distinct 
categories particularly critical to the relationship between the police 
power and the Public Trust doctrine,Justinian imbued both doctrines 
with the public interest.282 This common bond decreed the necessity 
that the sovereign act for the public good.283 The Institutes defined a 
jus regium shaped by the sovereign's royal right to manage resources 
for public safety and welfare.284 This is the root of today's police 
power.285 In Roman law, the Public Trust also reflected a similar pub-
lic interest purpose.286 Even the grant of land subject to a jus privatum 
title was still conditioned on jus publicum concerns.287 
The English continued the jus regium and jus publicum doctrines 
proposed by Justinian in their common law.288 When Lord Hale, who 
was both renowned by contemporaries and respected by later legal 
theorists, adapted Bracton's interpretation of The Institutes, it received 
additional strength.289 The rules laid down by Lord Hale have always 
been understood as the governing rules "recognized by the courts of 
justice as controlling doctrines. "290 Lord Hale saw a connection be-
tween jus publicum and jus regium: the sovereign had a duty to protect 
and preserve the jus publicum because the Crown protected public 
rights under his jus regium, the duties that a sovereign owed to its 
people.291 
280 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 13. 
281 See supra notes 185-99. 
282 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Devaney, supra note 10, at 45. 
283 See BUCKLAND & McNAIR, supra note 198, at 74; Fernandez, supra note 24, at 628. 
284 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636. 
285 SeeColIllIlonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,92-93 (1851). 
286 See Sax, judicialIntervention, supra note 9, at 477. 
287 See BUCKLAND & McNAIR, supra note 198, at 71; Fernandez, supra note 23, at 628. 
288 See Devaney, supra note 10, at 45. 
289 S. MOORE, supra note 6, at 327; Butler, supra note 6, at 861. 
290 Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,423-24 (1842). 
291 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861; Devaney, supra note 10, at 41. 
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The Public Trust doctrine is in one way much more limited than 
the police power. With the Public Trust, courts determine if the land 
contains water interests when deciding which land the trust applies to 
and which land it does not. 292 Courts trace this distinction back to Jus-
tinian. 293 The Public Trust doctrine treats as trust property those with 
water interests, such as sea shores or river banks.294 Water interests 
were critical because Romans depended upon the sea for com-
merce.295 The police power is not limited by such distinctions. 296 The 
jus regium applies to all lands within the border of the sovereignty.297 
The role of the sovereign is a key element that both the Public 
Trust and police power have in common.298 Justinian defined the 
royal prerogative, which developed into the police power, as the jus 
regium that the Crown holds to safeguard shores and navigable rivers 
for the common use and benefit of the public.299 Yet, the jus regium is 
not limited to lands with water interests. 300 
The history of delegation is also similar for both doctrines. 301 
Delegation traveled from the English crown, to the colonies through 
royal charters, and then to the people after the Revolutionary War.302 
The Supreme Court settled this succession, giving the people control 
of the police power and in effect allowing them to define its con-
tours.303 Effectively, however, the sovereign holds the police power in 
trust for the people. The reasons for this are pragmatic. In order to 
have a well regulated society, the government must exercise the police 
power through regulations and ordinances.304 Yet, the people can define 
the police power in part through a well drafted comprehensive plan. 
The Public Trust doctrine never grants the same full delegation 
power to the people. Although the sovereign holds the trust lands for 
the people, the sovereign exercises the power on their behalf, just as the 
292 Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410-11. 
293 See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53,92 (1851). 
294 See id. at 89-94; BUCKLAND & McNAIR, supra note 198, at 74. 
295 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 409. 
296 See Butler, supra note 6, at 893. 
297 See id. at 861. 
298 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636; Ausness, supra note 200, at 409. 
299 See S. MOORE, supra note 6, at 327. 
300 See Butler, supra note 6, at 861. 
301 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 411; Butler, supra note 6, at 880; Wilson, supra note 
218, at 845. 
302 See Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 PeL) 367,415 (1842). 
303 See id. 
304 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
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sovereign holds the police power.305 The right of regulation follows 
from the public interest of all property, just as the Public Trust doc-
trine does with those properties with water interests.306 The police 
power has no such limitations.307 Both fall under the sovereign's in-
terest in managing resources for the public benefit.30B 
Today, every citizen submits to regulation.309 Municipalities, in 
their sovereign role, act in the public interest by managing the Public 
Trust and by exercising the police power.310 Moreover, the sovereign 
cannot alienate either jus publicum or jus regium, especially because the 
public's interest is such an intrinsic element.311 
The judiciary plays a significant role in defining the scope of 
both doctrines.312 Courts have broadened legitimate police power 
goals in a more flexible embrace of preservation goals, an end result 
that is in the public interest.313 The Public Trust was first recognized 
by the judiciary in Arnold v. Mundy.314 While some states have now 
codified the Public Trust, the judiciary, urged by legal scholars, has 
been at the forefront of crafting the contours of the Public Trust.315 
Jus regium and the Public Trust doctrine were fused in nineteenth 
century jurisprudence.316 In fact, cases that discussed the jus regium 
were often premised on claims of the Public Trust doctrine.317 The 
305 See Illinois Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,456 (1892). 
306 See Martin, 41 U.S. at 410; Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. I, 78 (NJ. 1821). 
307 See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying text. 
308 See Village of Euclid, 41 U.S. at 387; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. 
309 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 66. 
310 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 636. 
m See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454-55. As long as a government existed, the 
police power existed. See Butler, supra note 6, at 846. 
312 See Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 566; Lazarus, supra note 6, at 646; Ma-
sotti & SeJfon, supra note 78, at 773; Bobrowski, supra note 2, at 711. 
313 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 678. 
314 Ausness, supra note 200, at 411. 
315 See Ausness, supra note 200, at 408 n.8; Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 315; Sax, Tak-
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Supreme Court also discussed the distinction in using either the jus 
regium or the Public Trust to decide a case.318 The Illinois Central ma-
jority viewed the Public Trust as the appropriate tool to invalidate the 
transfer of title to the railroad.319 The dissent, however, believed simi-
lar action could be accomplished instead with the police power.320 
Both doctrines have enjoyed a recent expansion of powers.321 
The police power has evolved in response to increased societal con-
cern.322 The application of police powers "must expand and contract 
to meet the new and different conditions. "323 
The police power's expansion has been under the "general wel-
fare" ambit of Village of Euclid.324 Some argue that the police power is 
not definable.325 This criticism is less relevant once a connection be-
tween the Public Trust and the police power is understood.326 The 
police power, like the Public Trust, is exercised for the public good, 
for a public purpose.327 Moreover, in the face of natural resource de-
pletion and desired aesthetic protection, municipalities may want to 
employ the police power beyond general welfare concerns to deal 
with public interests. 
In using the police power in this broad way, municipalities can 
avoid charges of arbitrary and capricious acts. The police power's 
public purpose intent can be further defined when a municipality 
adopts a comprehensive plan.328 To avoid successful challenges to zon-
ing ordinances, municipalities should flex police power limits by iden-
tifying the expectations of private property owners.329 
A comprehensive plan memorializes those definitions to promote 
and enhance their community character.33o Without this open com-
munication, municipalities will be hard pressed to conduct honest 
318 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 456, 466-67. 
319 See id. at 456. 
320 See id. at 466-67. 
321 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 633; Symposium, supra note 26, at 1446. 
322 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 658. 
323 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). 
324 See id. at 395. 
325 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Justice Douglas wrote that "an attempt 
to define [the police power's] reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless .... " See id.; Sax, 
Takings, supra note 23, at 39. 
326 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456, 466-67 (1892). 
327 See KUNSTLER, supra note 12, at 27. 
328 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174-75. 
329 Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 187. 
330 See Haar, supra note 20, at 1174-75. 
716 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:683 
dealings with private property owners.331 And if the zoning ordinance 
is struck down because reasonable expectations are not met, it also 
fails because community members were not given sufficient notice of 
standards through the comprehensive plan goals.332 
B. Revitalization of Public Trust 
The Public Trust was revitalized by Professor Joseph Sax in the 
1970s.333 While Sax originally premised his theory on the ability of 
citizens to step in and force government action, most cases now are 
brought by the government.334 The main critique of the recent expan-
sion of the Public Trust is two-fold. First, it is most often a judge-made 
doctrine.335 Secondly, private property owners are caught off guard, 
not knowing that they are essentially missing property rights.336 At 
some point, as argued by Professor Joseph Sax, important public val-
ues will demand that protections increase, even if at the detriment of 
private property ownership.337 
The police power can overcome the criticisms aimed at the Pub-
lic Trust. First, the judiciary need not define the police power as it 
does the Public Trust. Instead, the municipalities should define it, 
both by working within the public interest and by defining those in-
terests through a comprehensive plan. Secondly, the private property 
owner may participate in that definitional exercise and therefore 
would be hard pressed to argue in good faith that the comprehensive 
plan unreasonably impinges on ownership expectations. Moreover, 
the municipality should argue that the private property owner had 
reasonable notice of the police power through the current commu-
nity condition and ambiance. 
Both of these expansions are responses to changing conceptions 
of property.338 There are indeed fewer "sticks in the bundle. "339 The 
331 See Regan, supra note 88, at 1029. 
332 Masotti & Selfon, supra note 78, at 778. 
333 See passim Sax, Public Trust, supra note 136; Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9; 
Sax, Takings, supra note 22. 
334 See passim Sax, Public Trust, supra note 136; Sax, Judicial Intervention, supra note 9; 
Sax, Takings, supra note 22. 
335 See Wilkinson, supra note 24, at 315. 
336 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188. 
337 See id. at 188 n.13. 
338 See Karkkainen, supra note 17, at 69-70; see also Lazarus, supra note 6, at 692. 
339 See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 679 1l.303; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
2001] Police Power and the Public Trust 717 
essence of property law is respect for reasonable expectations,34o yet 
increased demand on resources places these reasonable expectations 
at risk.341 An ambiguous general welfare standard simply cannot pro-
tect the public interest with definable, limitable goals, but the police 
power can. 
Both expansions are also in response to growing demands on re-
sources and land.342 Perhaps this growth is appropriate. Public lands, 
whether public because affected by public regulation or because part 
of the Public Trust, is in fact valuable because of its "publicness. "343 If 
constituents so value this public land, municipalities will face de-
mands of property protection in the face of resource depletion. 
C. Revitalization of the Police Power 
This conflation of the Public Trust and the police power is the 
correct course. The expansion of police power need not be unnatu-
rally linked to the Village of Euclid criteria.344 Inherently, the police 
power contains a public purpose element that can be better defined 
than an ad hoc, rationalized connection to the general welfare crite-
rion.345 When municipalities place restrictions on land, they are acting 
as sovereigns, in the public interest, exercising their jus regium.346 Po-
lice powers do erode private property rights, but states can limit that 
erosion by compelling municipalities to act in the public interest by 
defining their police power in part through comprehensive plans. 347 
By properly acknowledging the roots of the police power,348 mu-
nicipalities can only act within the public purpose rationale. Both ex-
pansions are reasonable, given common roots in public purpose. Such 
a distinction may seem like splitting hairs, the difference between the 
public interest and general welfare is one just of degree. But a mu-
nicipality's ability to define the limits of the public interest, including 
nurturing community character, under the police power is an achiev-
able goal, particularly with comprehensive plans. The reasonable ex-
340 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188. 
34l See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. 
342 See supra note 322-28 and accompanying text. 
343 Rose, supra note 80, at 773. 
344 SeeVillage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
345 See Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. City of Boston, 560 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 (1990); Sax, 
Judicial Intervention, supra note 9, at 559. 
346 See Sax, Takings, supra note 23, at 63. 
347 SeePa. Coal v. Mahon, 26 U.S. 393,413 (1922). 
346 See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; see also Berman v. Pal'ker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
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pectations of private property owners cannot be violated because the 
community members define those expectations, such as fostering 
neighborhood ambiance, through a comprehensive plan.349 Still, mu-
nicipalities must stay within their delegated authority, a public interest 
foundation which makes the municipality a trustee of public interests, 
as it does with the Public Trust doctrine.350 
CONCLUSION 
Municipalities should zone under the public interest element of 
their police power rather than the general welfare criterion from Vil-
lage of Euclid. In turn, the judiciary needs to recognize the Roman 
foundation of the police power, just as they acknowledged the same 
foundations in Public Trust cases. By recognizing the connection be-
tween these doctrines, the judiciary would encourage municipalities 
to define the contours of the police power in a more effective manner 
than through the general welfare criteria. A locality can recognize the 
unique qualities of its community through comprehensive plans. Still, 
communities should not view this as an opportunity to disregard im-
portant public interest elements that contribute to the community 
character, like neighborhood businesses and well-planned, affordable 
housing. Armed with a well-defined police power mandate and an 
honest assessment of all community needs, municipalities must in-
stead zone in the public interest. Localities should include in that 
mandate prescriptive zoning measures to protect and nurture their 
community character. 
349 See Sax, Public Trust, supra note 139, at 188. 
350 See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456, 466--67 (1892). 
